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The conscious or unconscious acquirement of knowledge in implicit category learning 
was examined in accordance with predictions made by the COVIS theory of categorization 
(Ashby & Maddox, 2011). COVIS assumes separate category learning systems. The explicit 
system relies on easily verbalized rules while the implicit system requires integration of more 
than one stimulus dimension. Participants in this experiment categorized lines varying in length 
and orientation as belonging to one of two categories; in the rule-based (RB) condition only 
length was relevant, while participants in the information integration (II) condition needed to 
integrate both dimensions. Corrective feedback was provided during training. In test phases, 
participants were asked to attribute their responses to one of four criteria (guess, intuition, 
memory, or rule), a measure adapted from Dienes and Scott (2005). Neural activity in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was recorded with a 20-optode fNIRS system. We found 
that in the implicit (II) learning condition, participants who reported guessing less than half the 
time were learning but were unconscious to the structures driving that learning, reflected by 
accuracy, attribution self-report and neural activation. Our results substantiate the claim that 
implicit category learning is mediated unconsciously and evidence the dual-system model of 
categorization postulated by COVIS, furthering our understanding of category learning and thus, 
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Medical doctors review highly variable breast scans to determine whether an individual’s 
breast tissue does or does not contain cancer cells, with each of the two decisions affecting how 
they proceed. Similarly, you may decide not to bring an umbrella to work by noting that the sky 
is clear on a given morning. Both scenarios are examples of categorization, a fundamental 
cognitive process that underlies our ability to differentiate and understand objects, concepts, and 
events. Distinct yet related items can be arranged into infinite numbers of category groups. These 
delineations allow us to predict patterns in our surroundings and prove effective as schemas for 
mental organization and stimulus-response behavior.  
The process by which humans learn to categorize has been contested and explained by 
three opposing theories. Prototype theory suggests that a category group can be represented in 
the mind by an abstract prototype or average of the members of that group, which serves as the 
standard for category membership (Minda & Smith, 2011). Conversely, the exemplar model 
assumes that membership in a category is determined by individual memories for multiple 
entities (i.e, exemplars) in a category, rather than a single prototype (Nosofsky, 2011). Decision 
bound theory argues for categorization based on rules or boundaries between categories (Maddox 
& Ashby, 1993).  Although multiple theories of categorization exist, few accurately represent 
category learning in light of the evidenced existence of multiple category learning systems in the 
latter half of the 1990s, at which point research shifted to understanding each system individually 
and as they interact (Ashby & Maddox, 2011).  
One prominent theory, known as COVIS (for Competition between Verbal and Implicit 
Systems), assumes separate category learning systems, one implicit and one explicit, that are 
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always active. The two systems compete to produce a categorization response dependent upon 
the nature of a given stimulus (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken & Waldron, 1998; Ashby & 
Maddox, 2005). COVIS maintains that explicit or rule-based (RB) learning relies on easily 
verbalized rules. The implicit, nonverbalizable system requires consideration of two or more 
stimulus dimensions, otherwise known as information-integration (II).  
 
Neuroimaging in Categorization Research 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data suggest that explicit learning is 
mediated by a neural network including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), while the 
key structure implicated in the implicit system is the striatum, a subcortical input center of the 
basal ganglia. Activity in both areas can be further dissected by whether a given participant 
successfully learns or fails to learn the appropriate rule in a categorization study (Ashby & 
Maddox, 2011).  
Two studies using fMRI technology evidenced increased activation in Brodmann Areas 
(BA) 9 and BA46 (Filoteo et al., 2005) and BA9, BA44 and BA47 (Cincotta & Seger, 2007) 
during rule-based and information-integration category learning tasks, respectively. 
Filoteo et al. (2005) conducted a perceptual categorization task (i.e., explicit) using 
simple lines varying in length and orientation. Optimum accuracy required that participants only 
attend to line length and ignore line orientation, which they were to learn independently trial-by-
trial. Filoteo et al. (2005) also used a comparator task in which participants categorized lines 
colored blue or yellow. Conversely, Cincotta and Seger (2007) employed feedback and 
observational learning tasks (i.e., implicit) using two stimuli sets, both varying spatially and by 
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angle. One set included two lines, one varied in length and the other in angle. The second set 
featured circles varying in diameter, with center-to-edge lines varying in angle. Participants in 
this experiment needed to integrate both stimulus dimensions in both sets.  
 Neuroimaging technology is a means by which to draw correlative conclusions between 
neural function and behavior in a category-learning paradigm. As it pertains to COVIS, 
discrepancies in neuroimaging data between RB and II categorization tasks support a dual-
system model of categorization and can substantiate the theoretical claims that drive this 
research. Although fMRI has high spatial resolution, it is extremely costly. An emerging 
alternative is functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). fNIRS operates via neurovascular 
coupling, by which cerebral blood flow and cerebral blood volume increase during neural 
activity. Oxygen floods the recruited area of the brain via oxygenated hemoglobin (oxy-Hb) to 
compensate for increased deoxygenated hemoglobin (deoxy-Hb), from which oxygen is 
withdrawn for use in metabolism (Izzetoglu, Bunce, Izzetoglu, Onaral, & Pourrezaei, 2007; 
Bunce, Izzetoglu, Izzetoglu, Onaral, & Pourrezaei 2006). Both oxy- and deoxy-Hb have optical 
properties in the near-infrared range, specifically 700-900nm. Thus, like fMRI, fNIRS measures 
the relative changes in concentration of these molecules (i.e., the BOLD response) (Bunce et al., 
2006).  
 Whereas fMRI can access subcortical structures, fNIRS is limited to the cortical layer of  
DLPFC (BA9 & BA46), anterior PFC (BA 10), part of the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), and 
part of the ventral frontal cortex (BA47) (Izzetoglu et al., 2007), areas of the brain pertinent to 





Figure 1: Sagittal view of the brain signifying relevant Brodmann areas in red  
Source: University of Michigan 
http://www.umich.edu/~cogneuro/jpg/Brodmann.html 
 
Consciousness of Learning in an Implicit Categorization Task 
 Despite the growing body of neural and behavioral evidence supporting the dual-system 
model of category learning, the functional properties of the implicit system remain unclear. 
Categorization criteria acquired via the explicit system are determinably conscious to the 
individual because they are easily verbalized, but the consciousness of implicit learning is yet to 
be understood. In other words, it is unclear whether individuals are aware that they are acquiring 
knowledge in an implicit categorization task.  
 Dienes and Scott (2005) postulated that the implicit learning system could be dissociated 
into its conscious and unconscious components by means of subjective assessment including five 
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criteria, namely guess, intuition, pre-existing knowledge, memory, and rule, representing a 
spectrum from unconscious to conscious. In an artificial grammar task, participants were trained 
in the structure of grammar strings before determining whether test strings fit the structure of the 
training material and attributing their decisions by the subjective measure. If participants were 
conscious of the grammar structure presented in training, Dienes and Scott (2005) contended that 
their reported attributions in the test phase should reflect that consciousness. Alternately, if the 
structural knowledge was unconsciously acquired, participants would likely believe they were 
guessing throughout the experiment.  They concluded that their results validated this form of 
subjective measure in analyzing consciousness of acquired knowledge, noting that the guess and 
intuition criteria behaved similarly, as did the memory and rule criteria, while the pre-existing 
knowledge criterion was virtually unused.  
In accordance with the results of Dienes and Scott (2005), we expected participants 
categorizing stimuli in an II task to report intuition more frequently than participants in an RB 
task. Alternately, we expected participants in an RB task to report rule as their source of 
knowledge more than participants in an II task. We postulated that neuroimaging data would 
corroborate these predictions, assuming that subjective measure reflects consciousness of 
knowledge when compared to categorization accuracy across RB and II tasks. 
 
Linking BOLD Response to Implicit Knowledge 
 Based on present fMRI data, we expected hemodynamic activity to decrease over time as 
a product of the participant learning and continually applying the appropriate rule to the RB task. 
In the II task, we predicted DLPFC activity would decrease more slowly while participants 
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continually applied a suboptimal (i.e. verbalizable) rule when a non-verbalizable rule was more 
optimal. If participant accuracy improved over the course of the II task, the elevated neural 
function and report of intuition would suggest that knowledge had been unconsciously acquired. 
Similarly, decreased neural activity during the RB task, in which participants would purportedly 
cite rule as the source of their knowledge, would evidence conscious acquirement of knowledge. 
In the present study, we used fNIRS to gain a more complete understanding of categorization 
knowledge by making explicit the relationship between brain and behavior.  
 
The fNIRs System 
In this experiment, we collected data with the NIRSport (Figure 2). This system, designed 
by NIRx, offers a flexible user-configured cap with 8 LED photoemitters and 8 active-detection 
receivers and operates on the principles of light absorption and dispersion. Once the light, in 
wavelengths of 760 nm and 850nm, is introduced into the cortex in continuous and slow pulses, 
it is either absorbed by chromophores oxy- and deoxy-Hb or scattered back the surface by 
intracellular bodies and collected by the photodetectors (NIRx, 2015; Izzetogulu et al., 2007).  
The activation levels are determined by a modified-beer lambert law in which changes in 
absorption are a product of concentrative changes in oxy- and deoxy-HB, where scattered light 
remains constant despite cognitive activity (i.e., number of intracellular bodies do not 


















The present study aimed to assess for the conscious or unconscious acquisition of 
knowledge in the implicit category learning system via behavioral and neuroimaging data. 
Perceptual stimuli for the rule-based and information-integration tasks were adapted from the 
studies conducted by Filoteo et al. (2005) and Cincotta and Seger (2007), respectively, while the 
subjective measure is modeled after that of Dienes and Scott (2005). 
One rule-based and one information-integration category structure was used in this 
experiment. Stimuli, sampled from a normal distribution, consisted of lines varying in length and 
orientation and are described in Figure 3. Symbols in Figure 3 represent features of each 
individual stimulus, with decision bounds denoting accuracy-maximizing criterion.  
 
 
Figure 3: Stimuli distribution 
On each trial, participants were presented with a line varying in length and orientation. (a) In the RB condition, only 
line length is relevant. (b) In the II category, participants needed consider length and orientation. Circles signify 
stimulus values for Category 1, while pluses signify values for Category 2, separated by the accuracy-maximizing 
decision rule, represented by the dotted line.  
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For the RB task (Figure 3A), participants needed only consider line length, e.g., if the line 
is short, it belongs in category A and if the line is long, it belongs in category B; the II task 
(Figure 3B) required integration of both line length and orientation, for which there was no easily 
verbalizable rule.  
Participants in this study, which was designed between subjects, completed 24 30-trial 
blocks of alternating 10-trial baseline, training, and test tasks, in that order. The baseline task is 
described in Figure 4 and employed the test stimuli, i.e. lines varying in length and orientation, 
colored blue or yellow, which participants identified by color. In the next 10 trials, corrective 
feedback shaped learning following categorical responses to test stimuli. The feedback, 
described in Figures 4 and 5, followed “Correct, that was A” for correct responses or “Incorrect, 
that was B” for incorrect responses. In the next 10 experimental trials, participants attributed 
their decisions to guess, intuition, memory or rule following their responses to the stimuli as 

















Figure 4: Baseline task 
(a) Participants identified lines varying in length and orientation as either blue or yellow. (b) They recorded their 
responses by stroking a key marked blue or a key marked yellow based on the color of the line on the screen. (c) 






Figure 5: Training task 
(a) During training trials, participants were presented with lines varying in length and orientation. (b) Participants 
categorized these lines as belonging to Category A or Category B based on each line’s respective features. (c) 














Figure 6: Attribution task 
(a) During test trials, participants were presented with lines varying in length and orientation. (b) Participants 
categorized these lines as belonging to Category A or Category B based on each line’s respective features. (c) 
Following responses, participants were asked to attribute their decision to one of the four criteria, i.e. guess, 





 Eleven participants were recruited from the University of Central Florida undergraduate 
student population and received research credit for participation in this study. Demographic 
information, including skin and hair color, was collected from participants before 
experimentation, which lasted approximately 75 minutes, including an allotted 30 minutes for 
fNIRS setup.  
 
Procedure 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant before the experiment, which 
limitedly explained the purpose of the experiment and fNIRS device. In a room lit only by 
natural light, participants’ heads were measured for circumference and relative centricity, 
denoting the size of the cap to be used. Cap size ranged from 54 to 60 inches in two-inch 
increments. Before applying the cap, participants were asked to part their hair down the center of 
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the scalp as accurately as possible. Wooden spatulas were used to move hair away from the 
grommets in the cap and water soluble gel was applied to the scalp to facilitate the connection 
between the optodes and the skin. The fNIRS system was calibrated before and after applying an 
over cap to each participant’s head to check for bad channels, which, if any were present, were 
corrected as best as possible before beginning the experiment.  
Upon completing setup, participants were instructed to hold their head in a chinrest (for 
the duration of the experiment) to reduce motion interference and read the instructions appearing 
on the screen in front of them, at which point the fNIRS system began recording. The 
instructions informed participants that they would be using keyboard keys demarcated blue, 
yellow, A and B for the respective tasks. An additional instruction screen defined the four 
attribution criteria and their respective keyboard keys as follows: (1) guess: You have no basis 
whatsoever for your judgment. You might as well have flipped a coin to arrive at your choice, 
(2) intuition: You have some confidence in your judgment (anything from a small amount to 
complete certainty). You know, to some degree, that your judgment is right, but you have 
absolutely no idea why it is right, (3) memory: You based your judgment on memory for 
particular items from earlier trials and (4) rule: You based your judgment on some rule or rules 
acquired throughout training and that, if asked, you would be able to state your rule (Dienes & 
Scott, 2005). These definitions appeared at the beginning of each 30-trial block. An additional 
paper description of the attributions and their respective keys was placed on the desk to remind 









Figure 7 displays average accuracy by block for the RB (n = 6) and II (n = 5) conditions. 
A two-way, mixed-factor ANOVA showed neither a significant effect of block, F(2, 18) = 2.103, 
p = .151, nor condition, F(1, 9) = 0.90, p = .771. 
 
 
Figure 7: Average participant accuracy over blocks 
 
Before analyzing attribution responses, we sorted participants into two categories 
(“guessers” and “non-guessers”) to determine whether we could predict task accuracy by the 
extent to which participants reported the “guess” criterion. This designation was based on a 









































of 0.5 or higher over blocks while “non-guessers” reported that they were guessing less than half 
the time, i.e., reported an average of the three other criteria (intuition, memory and rule) more 
than half of the time. In the RB condition (n = 6), there were three “guessers” and three “non-
guessers. In the II condition (n = 5), there were two “guessers” and three “non-guessers.” In both 
conditions, we predicted that “non-guessers” would perform with higher accuracy than 
“guessers,” which is plotted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Accuracy for “guessers” and “non-guessers” by condition 
“Non-guessers” performed with higher accuracy in both the RB and II conditions across blocks. 
 
 
In block 3 of the II condition, we found a significant difference in accuracy between 
“guessers” and “non-guessers,” t(1) = 2.887, p < .05, and a near-significant effect in block 2 of 
























We compiled the average proportion of responses for each of the four attribution criteria 
by block, reported in Table 1.  
 
Average Proportion of Reported Attributions 
RB Guess Intuition Memory Rule 
Block 1 0.575 0.167 0.210 0.048 
Block 2 0.625 0.160 0.146 0.069 
Block 3 0.554 0.210 0.123 0.113 
II Guess Intuition Memory Rule 
Block 1 0.315 0.443 0.218 0.025 
Block 2 0.280 0.415 0.245 0.060 
Block 3 0.335 0.443 0.173 0.050 
 




We predicted that participants in the II condition would more often report intuition than 
those in the RB condition, whom we predicted would report rule more frequently than their II 
counterparts. The average proportion of responses for both criteria across condition and block are 
shown in Figure 9. We found a significant effect by condition for reporting of intuition, F(1, 9) = 
10.282, p < .05, supporting our claim that participants in the II condition would report intuition 
more frequently. There was no significant effect of block, F(2, 18) = 0.219, p = .651. Participants 
in the RB condition attributed their responses to rule more often than participants in the II 






Figure 9: Average proportion of reported responses for intuition and rule 
Participants in the II condition reported intuition more frequently than participants in the RB condition for all three blocks. Alternately, 










We compared levels of BOLD activity across conditions for “non-guessers.” Figure 10 
shows the average participant activation level per block, calculated by subtracting average levels 
in the RB condition from the II condition. The difference in activation was significant (p < .05) 
in block 3, supporting our hypothesis that hemodynamic response should decrease more rapidly 
in the RB condition than the II condition as participants learned and applied the appropriate rule. 
Given that the participants included in fNIRS analysis were selected on the basis of reporting 
that they were no longer guessing, these results also underscore the relationship between the 
behavioral results and attribution results.  In the II condition, these same participants more 














Figure 10: BOLD activity over blocks for “non-guessers” 
The average level of activity in the II condition minus the average level of activity in the RB condition is reported here. For all three blocks, 












 In this study, we examined the conscious or unconscious acquirement of knowledge 
during rule-based and information-integration category learning tasks. Each participant 
completed a baseline task by identifying blue and yellow lines with corresponding blue and 
yellow keyboard keys before completing two categorization tasks, one with corrective feedback 
(training) and one with subjective report after each category response. The attribution report 
consisted of four criteria: (1) guess: You have no basis whatsoever for your judgment. You might 
as well have flipped a coin to arrive at your choice, (2) intuition: You have some confidence in 
your judgment (anything from a small amount to complete certainty). You know, to some 
degree, that your judgment is right, but you have absolutely no idea why it is right, (3) memory: 
You based your judgment on memory for particular items from earlier trials and (4) rule: You 
based your judgment on some rule or rules acquired throughout training and that, if asked, you 
would be able to state your rule (Dienes & Scott, 2005). The stimuli sets for both conditions 
consisted of lines varying in length and orientation. Participants in the RB condition needed only 
concentrate on length while participants in the II condition needed to integrate both stimulus 
dimensions (length and orientation) to maximize accuracy.  
 By sorting participants as “guessers” and “non-guessers,” we were able to establish via 
accuracy data that “non-guessers” did learn, i.e., acquire knowledge, over blocks at near-
significance in the second block and significance in the third block. We hypothesized that 
participants in the II condition would report intuition more frequently than participants in the RB 
condition, for which we found a significant difference by condition. We also found evidence that 
participants in the RB condition reported rule more frequently, although these results were 
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nonsignificant. Based on our findings, we can predict with some certainty that participants who 
do not believe they are guessing in an implicit task will improve in accuracy over time yet 
remain unsure of the basis for their category judgments, or at least feel they cannot quite 
verbalize the basis for responding. Thus, our results support that claim that in an implicit 
learning paradigm, category knowledge is acquired unconsciously for participants who learn to 
perform the task.  
By analyzing fNIRS data from “non-guessers,” we were further able to underscore the 
relationship between behavioral data and subjective measure. Hemodynamic response decreased 
more rapidly for participants in the RB condition, suggesting that participants in the II condition 
did not consciously acquire the appropriate rule for the II task. Our findings that learning did 
occur for non-guessers in the implicit task suggest that implicit category learning is mediated 
separately from the explicit system in DLPFC. Thus, our results substantiate the dual-system 
model of categorization, as COVIS is the only theory that could account for our results as it 
pertains to both the attributions and neural response.   
This research was primarily limited by its small sample size (N = 11) and thus its low 
power, further complicated by the division of the participant group into “guessers” and “non-
guessers.” A large sample size could account for participants who are not actively engaged in the 
experiment and simply report guessing as a product. This experiment may have also been limited 
by the reliability of our self-report measure between participants. It is possible that, despite the 
given definitions, participants held different interpretations as to what constituted use of the 
different criteria (guess, intuition, memory, and rule). As such, “guessers” may not have been 
alike in their report of the guess criterion and vice versa with “non-guessers.”  
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Despite its limitations, we believe this experiment furthers the neurobiological 
understanding of category learning and further explicates the ways in which learning takes place, 
particularly in the implicit system. As we come to understand category-learning structures, we 
can also contribute to improved learning models for categorization and in turn, decrease the 






















This research, to some degree, identifies the acquisition of knowledge in implicit 
category learning as unconscious to the individual and substantiates the link between behavior 
and neural activation. The use of subjective measure emphasizes the distinction between explicit 
and implicit category learning systems. This, in accordance with neuroimaging data, allowed us 
to establish the efficacy of COVIS as a model for category learning and evidence the claim that 
category learning is mediated by two separate systems, one explicit and one implicit. Further, 
this research contributes to our understanding of underlying category learning processes and 
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